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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 07-1663
_____________
THOMAS PEVARNIK,
                                                     Appellant
   v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY
_____________
Appeal from the Order of the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
Civil No. 05-cv-01600
District Judge: Honorable Alan N. Bloch
____________
 Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
March 11, 2008
____________
Before: FUENTES, CHAGARES AND ALDISERT, Circuit Judges
(Filed March 28, 2008) 
                      
OPINION 
                      
ALDISERT, Circuit Judge
Appellant Thomas Pevarnik appeals from an order of the United States District
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania affirming the Commissioner of Social
2Security’s denial of disability benefits. Finding that substantial evidence supports the
Commissioner’s determination that Mr. Pevarnik was not disabled under Title XVI of the
Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1383f, we will affirm.
Because we write exclusively for the parties and the parties are familiar with the
facts and proceedings below, we will not revisit them here.
I.
Federal court review of the Commissioner’s determination is expressly limited.
This Court must uphold the Commissioner’s finding if it is supported by substantial
evidence in the record. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 552 (3d
Cir. 2005). “Substantial evidence ‘does not mean a large or considerable amount of
evidence, but rather such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.’” Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360 (3d Cir. 1999)
(quoting Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988)). Even if we would have
decided differently, we must not set aside the Commissioner’s determination if it is
supported by substantial evidence. Id. 
Because the Appeals Council denied Mr. Pevarnik’s request for review of the
Administrative Law Judge’s determination, the ALJ’s decision became the final decision
of the Commissioner for purposes of judicial review. Thus, we will apply the substantial
evidence standard to the ALJ’s determination.
II.
The Act defines disability in terms of one’s ability to function in the workplace. 42
3U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). To meet the Act’s definition of disability, a claimant must show
that he “is unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically
determinable physical or mental impairment . . . which has lasted or can be expected to
last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months.” Id. The Commissioner has
established a five-step process for evaluating disability claims. The process requires the
Commissioner to determine sequentially whether the claimant: (i) is working; (ii) has a
severe medical impairment; (iii) has a severe medical impairment that meets or equals the
criteria of an impairment listed in the regulations; (iv) can return to his past work; and (v)
can perform other work based upon his residual functional capacity, age, education and
work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4). In this case, the ALJ found that Mr. Pevarnik
“has the severe impairments of bipolar depression/anxiety, a personality disorder, and a
history of alcohol dependence, but that he does not have an impairment, or combination
of impairments, that meets or equals one contained” in the regulations. App. 18. In
addition, the ALJ found that Mr. Pevarnik possessed the residual functional capacity to
perform work available in the national economy and therefore did not meet the Act’s
definition of disability. Id. at 19.
The ALJ’s findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record. Mr.
Pevarnik’s own statements indicate that he had no limitations in performing a variety of
personal care and household tasks. The ALJ also reviewed reports submitted by several
mental health professionals who evaluated Mr. Pevarnik. Many of these reports indicated
that Mr. Pevarnik could care for himself and his finances without limitation and possessed
4a global assessment of functioning score of 65. Although the report of a physician
identified as Mr. Pevarnik’s treating psychiatrist indicated a more severe impairment and
a global assessment of functioning score of 45, the ALJ noted that this report was
inconsistent with this same psychiatrist’s own notes documenting Mr. Pervarnik’s prior
sporadic visits of short duration with the physician, the opinions and reports of other
consultative psychiatrists, and Mr. Pevarnik’s own statements concerning his wide range
of daily activities. Thus, the ALJ did not err in affording the treating psychiatrist’s
opinion only minimal weight.
The ALJ also heard testimony from a vocational expert concerning Mr. Pevarnik’s
ability to perform a job in the national economy. The ALJ asked the vocational expert to
identify jobs, if any, requiring simple, routine, repetitive tasks, not performed in a
production- or quota-based environment; involving only simple, work-related decisions
and, in general, relatively few workplace changes; requiring no more than occasional
interaction with supervisors and avoiding interaction and communication with co-workers
and the general public; and requiring no prolonged reading for content or comprehension
that a hypothetical person of Mr. Pevarnik’s age, education and work experience could
perform. Based upon this limiting criteria, the vocational expert identified a number of
jobs available locally that such a person could perform. Thus, the ALJ did not err in
determining that Mr. Pevarnik possessed the ability to perform work based upon his
residual functional capacity, and we are satisfied that the ALJ’s findings are supported by
substantial evidence in the record.
5We have considered all contentions of the parties and conclude that no further
discussion is necessary.
The judgment of the District Court will be affirmed.
